

*We will make the European Union stronger and more resilient, through even greater unity and solidarity amongst us and the respect of common rules (…) We pledge to work towards a safe and secure Europe: a Union where all citizens feel safe and can move freely, where our external borders are secured, with an efficient, responsible and sustainable migration policy, respecting international norms.*

*(Rome Declaration, 27 March 2017)*

*Migration will stay on our radar. Europe is not a fortress and must never become one. Europe is and must remain the continent of solidarity, where those fleeing persecution can find refuge.*

*(Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address, 13 September 2017)*

*On migration, we still have important and hard work ahead of us. We need to consolidate our external migration policy, improve our capacity for returns and reach durable solutions on a reformed asylum system.*

*(Donald Tusk, 21 September 2017)*

The challenge of the refugee and migration crisis demanded a swift and determined response from the European Union and its Member States. The actions taken meant more than 620 000 lives rescued in the Mediterranean Sea[[1]](#footnote-1), more humanitarian support[[2]](#footnote-2), stronger intervention to address the root causes of migration and better control of our external border. They also helped to reduce the number of irregular crossings: the numbers of arrivals to Greece dropped from some 177 000 in 2016 to around 35 000 in 2017 and in Italy, about 30% fewer people have been arriving than for the same period in 2016. New controlled, legal pathways were opened for almost 26 000 people through the EU resettlement schemes.

But from the outset, it has also been clear that the fundamental challenge is to put in place a more robust and secure system for the long term.

Migration dynamics in an increasingly interconnected world are here to stay; demography in the EU and its neighbourhood points to a long term challenge.[[3]](#footnote-3) In this context, migration policy needs to be effectively managed in line with the importance citizens attach to it.

The thematic debate on the internal and external dimensions of migration to be held under the Leaders' Agenda at the December European Council provides an opportunity at the highest political level to give a strategic orientation on the key policy directions for the future.

The lesson of the past few years is that unilateral measures have yielded little, have been more costly to apply and risked undermining the benefits of Schengen. In September, the Commission took stock of the delivery of the European Agenda on Migration since 2015.[[4]](#footnote-4) This showed how, in spite of incremental challenges, a common approach has been able to stabilise a highly volatile situation through the progressive pooling of resources and coordinated work towards a common objective. It highlighted the need for a comprehensive approach, making full use of the entire range of tools at the EU's disposal, combining our legal framework, our policy levers and the EU budget to deliver results. It also underlined the shortcomings in managing peaks of migratory pressure without adequate preparedness, information sharing arrangements, rapid response operational capabilities and flexible funding instruments at EU level.

The time has come to find the solutions to move from an "ad hoc" approach based on crisis management, towards a stable future-proof asylum framework, part of a fully integrated EU migration policy. Looking ahead, a reformed Common European Asylum System that is fully fit for purpose is therefore indispensable.

By consolidating its existing actions and agreeing on how to combine solidarity and a fair share of responsibility, the EU will be able to show that a strong asylum and migration management framework is in place to inspire confidence and mutual trust for the future.

**1. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSION: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

In responding to the most severe migratory challenge since the Second World War, starting in 2015 the European Union has taken action on several fronts. A new approach to dealing with migration has gradually emerged. This is based on combining a range of internal and external policy tools. Two years on, the lesson learned is that only a comprehensive approach works. Focusing just on the internal dimension and support to Member States is not sufficient. At the same time, an external migration policy alone would not solve the migratory challenge for Europe.

The EU has taken important steps to support the Member States most exposed to the exceptionally large inflow of refugees and migrants, in particular Greece and Italy. Through the creation of hotspots, national administrations and services have worked together with experts from EU agencies and ultimately ensured a more effective management of the external border. Member States have also expressed solidarity through the relocation mechanism. After a difficult start-up phase, the relocation programme has allowed 32 366 people from Greece and Italy to be transferred to other EU Member States, proving to be a valuable instrument to help those in need of international protection and to alleviate pressure on the asylum systems of the two countries. Greece and Italy, as well as other Member States, have received targeted support also in the form of financial assistance. With the assistance of the Emergency Support Instrument, which has contracted more than EUR 440 million to support the refugee response in Greece, the EU has introduced a new tool to address humanitarian emergencies within its borders.

With agreement reached in record time on the Commission's proposal,[[5]](#footnote-5) the operationalisation of the newly created European Border and Coast Guard has added a further powerful tool to strengthen the control of the external border and provide rapid assistance to Member States exposed to severe migratory pressure. In this way, the Agency complements the primary responsibility of the Member States for control at the external border, with their 100 000 border and coast guard officers devoted to this task. The Agency is operated with and for the Member States – the speed and effectiveness of its operations depends on the commitment and steer given by the Management Board and each of the representatives of the Member States in it. This commitment and steer are essential to realise the benefits in terms of mutual confidence between Member States and enhanced security.

At the same time, the effectiveness of EU support to the Member States under most pressure has been reinforced by the parallel efforts to work with third country partners. While the EU support to Greece helped cope with the large numbers of refugees crossing into the country, the joint management of migration through the EU-Turkey Statement has resulted in the reduction of dangerous journeys across the Aegean and the significant decrease in migratory pressure. The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey has been a major contributor to stability amongst the large refugee population in Turkey, supporting the work of Turkey to supply basic living standards, education and health for refugees. Coastguards and migration services have worked increasingly closely, both in terms of operations and capacity-building. Police and law enforcement services are developing new approaches in a joint effort to fight smuggling networks responsible for transporting people.

Equally, Italy received support to deal with the high number of migrants and refugees reaching its shores, in line with the Malta Declaration of 3 February 2017.[[6]](#footnote-6) Together with Italy, the EU has taken steps, in close cooperation with the Libyan authorities and in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organisation for Migration and other UN Agencies, to stabilise irregular flows across the Central Mediterranean and improve the protection and assistance to refugees and migrants stranded along the route. EU-financed projects will assist and protect more than 64 500 persons in detention centres, at disembarkation points or in host communities in Libya. The EU has also worked further downstream with other African countries under the Partnership Framework approach agreed in June 2016. In the Horn of Africa, EU-financed projects now under way will create over 44 000 jobs across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, and directly finance a further 30 000 jobs in South Sudan. Projects are supporting the delivery of basic social services to over 2.3 million beneficiaries. In West Africa and the Sahel, work under way targets the creation of 114 000 jobs, and supports almost 10 000 micro, small and medium enterprises. With EU support, Niger has stepped up the fight against smuggling along one of the main routes towards Libya. Countries such as Bangladesh have agreed with the EU a set of practical arrangements to improve the process of return of those citizens who do not have the right to remain in the EU.

Across the board, the launch of the first EU-wide resettlement scheme in July 2015 has contributed to alleviating pressure for irregular migration and offered legal pathways for people in need of international protection. Almost 26 000 people have been resettled under this scheme and the scheme established under the EU-Turkey Statement since their launch. A new, more ambitious target for 50 000 set by President Juncker in September this year is within reach.

Return policy offers another prime example of the need for and the benefits of a comprehensive approach. Steps have been taken to reinforce the EU dimension of return policy, and thus contribute to the efforts required for national return systems to be more coordinated and effective. Establishing a closer synergy between the return and asylum procedures could play a key role in further increasing the effectiveness of return policy as well as to keep track of its impact, through constant monitoring and sharing up-to-date data with the EU. A better integration of the support capability of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency can also improve return effectiveness. At the same time, national systems have a greater incentive to become more performing if the momentum to agree on well-functioning readmission agreements or practical arrangements with key countries of origin and transit is maintained.

**2. ADVANCING ON ALL FRONTS**

The different pillars of the comprehensive EU approach are not just inter-connected: their success relies heavily on maintaining the momentum of action on all fronts. The steps undertaken to address migration with third countries, to build a robust EU external border protection or to apply solidarity and responsibility inside the EU are all work in progress. In all areas, there is work to do to consolidate the results achieved and fix gaps.

The EU needs to keep up the work under way in order to further reduce irregular and dangerous journeys. In some cases this means looking to continue the work on successful initiatives; in others it means carrying through on existing plans, such as the full operationalisation of the European Border and Coast Guard and completing pledges for resettlement. It also means maintaining EU support to the Member States under the most pressure.

The work that has been invested in putting in place operational mechanisms has allowed the EU to handle the crisis effectively and must be carried forward; otherwise, current progress will be put at risk. The lessons learnt should be used to shape the tools developed to ensure our future responsiveness, including structural solutions to our migration system. It is equally important for the Member States to be equipped with the necessary administrative capacity for an efficient implementation of the reformed legal, operational and financial framework. In all these efforts, the unity of the EU and its Member States is the best guarantee to deliver the integrated, holistic approach that we need in order to succeed.

**3. FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO A STABLE FUTURE-PROOF ASYLUM FRAMEWORK**

***The integrated package for a sustainable asylum system***

In May and July 2016, the Commission proposed to reform the Common European Asylum System, putting forward a package of instruments to strengthen and to adapt the EU's asylum policy to the challenges of our time.

Reform of the existing system is needed to ensure that we are able to swiftly grant protection to those in need and return those who are not, as well as to address the risk of secondary movements and abuses undermining confidence and the smooth functioning of the Schengen area. It also serves to achieve greater convergence in the EU asylum system so as to ensure more equal and fair treatment of applicants across the EU. In a common European Asylum System, the recognition rates for applicants with the same nationality should not vary between Member States as much as they do today. For instance, in the case of Afghani nationals, they range from 0% to 98% between the Member States.[[7]](#footnote-7) It is also necessary to ensure rapid and efficient procedures. Today, asylum procedures can take a few months in some Member States and a few years in others. By tackling these issues, the Union will also remove incentives for asylum shopping and reduce pull factors towards the EU.

The Commission proposals for the reform of the Dublin Regulation, the Qualifications and Asylum Procedures Regulations and the Reception Conditions Directive pave the way to a system better prepared to deal with the possible arrival of a high number of people in need of international protection at the external borders, and to mechanisms which can deliver solidarity through a shared responsibility in handling peaks of arrivals of asylum seekers. Just as the European Border and Coast Guard has made it easier to assist Member States in ensuring the protection given to the external borders, the Commission also proposed to transform the European Asylum Support Office into a fully-fledged European Asylum Agency, to give Member States a new level of support in asylum management.

In addition, the Commission also proposed a Union Resettlement Framework to ensure orderly and safe pathways to Europe for persons in need of international protection and a reinforced Eurodac fingerprinting database to boost the fight against irregular migration.

All these reform proposals are in the course of being examined by the European Parliament and the Council and have been identified by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission as priorities under the Joint Declaration of 2016.[[8]](#footnote-8) A year and a half after the proposals were made, they find themselves at different stages of advancement within the legislative process. Some are close to adoption, such as the European Asylum Agency proposal and the reform of Eurodac. Others, namely the Union Resettlement Framework, the Qualifications Regulation and the Reception Conditions Directive, are advancing. On the other hand, considerable work is still needed on the proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation and the cornerstone proposal revising the Dublin Regulation. In this context, work on the EU safe third country concept should be also advanced, taking into account the June European Council Conclusions.

The core elements of the reform package are an interlocking and united set of measures which aim for a meaningful harmonisation replying to the challenges faced. They need to be looked at as a whole and should be adopted as a package, even if technical work can progress at different speed. However, as it is important to already lay down the key operational foundations contributing to a swifter roll-out of the entire reform, the European Asylum Agency and Eurodac proposals could usefully be adopted without needing to wait for the other main elements to be agreed. Any consequent changes linked to the rest of the package could be integrated subsequently.

***Solidarity and responsibility as core components of the integrated package***

A stable and future-proof asylum framework needs to be built on strong foundations and clear values: a more effective and fairer approach based on solidarity and responsibility. The centrality of these principles is reflected in the Treaties, which stipulate that *the policies of the Union set out in the Chapter on Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.[[9]](#footnote-9)*

The EU's response so far has drawn on these fundamental principles. Operationally, financially and politically, the EU has worked closer together on supporting the Member States under most pressure, through relocation and resettlement and through operational support in border and asylum matters, including through the EU agencies. This work has been most effective when the engagement has been at its broadest, when all Member States have benefitted and all Member States have contributed.

Agreement must be found on the appropriate way to balance these principles of responsibility and solidarity in the reform of the Common European Asylum System. In a common system and in a Schengen area without internal borders it is not possible to have the one without the other. While enhanced cooperation is always a last resort to break any deadlock, in this area it is not the way to organise a solidarity and responsibility mechanism, in which all Member States should participate. Failure to achieve this would continue to put the Schengen system under strain.

Instead, the lessons learnt and best practices of the past few years should serve as a guide to the way forward towards agreement. The most controversial aspect in the reform of the Dublin Regulation is the solidarity mechanism and its balance with responsibility. There are different ways to design it. The Commission first tabled a proposal for a permanent framework for a crisis relocation mechanism. In May 2016, it then tabled a more comprehensive and predictable approach, integrating a fairness mechanism into the Dublin rules that would be triggered automatically under certain circumstances. On the basis of this proposal, the Slovak, Maltese and Estonian Presidencies of the Council have worked towards a phased approach. The European Parliament is proposing a compulsory system of relocation that would apply generally regardless of the migratory pressure. Taking into account these positions, a way forward could be to adopt an approach where the component of compulsory relocation would apply to situations of serious crisis, while in less challenging situations, relocation would be based on voluntary commitments from Member States. In those situations, the solidarity to be provided would take different forms, drawn from both the internal and external dimensions of an integrated comprehensive migration policy. In this spirit, President Juncker recognised in the State of the Union Address 2017 that compromise will be needed to deliver this reform, and that the result should be the right one for our Union and fair to all its Member States.

**4. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION**

The EU has progressively put in place a genuine external migration policy, complementing and reinforcing the internal dimension. This work has contributed to decreasing dangerous journeys, to save the lives of migrants and brought to a new level the EU support to addressing the root causes of population movements and ensuring the protection of refugees and migrants. As migratory pressure on Europe will remain a challenge in the coming years, there is no alternative to consolidating and reinforcing the external dimension of migration.

On the Eastern Mediterranean route, it is necessary to ensure the continued full implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. The Member States already agreed in the EU-Turkey Statement to mobilise an additional EUR 3 billion for the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, shortly after the currently available resources have been contracted, and the other conditions set out in the EU-Turkey Statement are met. This should follow the model of the distribution of efforts between the EU budget and national budgets agreed in 2016.[[10]](#footnote-10) The pace of resettlements from Turkey should be maintained. Operationalising the voluntary humanitarian admission scheme will further contribute to ensuring legal pathways for Syrian refugees in Turkey. Close attention should be paid to the Western Balkans, through continued EU support to countries along the route and vigilance against secondary movements.

It is also necessary to strengthen work along the Central Mediterranean route, delivering on all aspects of the strategy set out in the Malta Declaration and the Action Plan on the Central Mediterranean. The EU and Member States, in cooperation with the Libyan authorities, the African Union, the International Organisation for Migration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other UN agencies, will urgently step up actions to ensure the protection of migrants and refugees in the country in full respect of their human rights, and put an end to violence and abuses by criminal networks. To this end, the EU has set up a Task Force with the African Union and the United Nations to save and protect lives of migrants and refugees along the routes and in particular in Libya, as announced in Abidjan on 29 November 2017. This will allow the programme of the International Organisation for Migration for assisted voluntary returns from Libya to countries of origin to be accelerated, funding an additional 15 000 returns by February 2018. Following the set-up of a “transit and departure facility” in Tripoli for people in need of international protection, the EU and Member States should support resettlements from Libya through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' emergency transit mechanism, with at least 1 000 resettlements by February 2018. Breaking the business model of smugglers remains a priority. In this context, the EU should support new projects for job creation and socio-economic development in local municipalities, in particular in Libya and Niger.

The changing patterns of migratory flows require continuous vigilance: for example, the Western Mediterranean/Atlantic route saw the total number of arrivals to Spain rising to over 25 500 in 2017, around 105% higher than that in the same period in 2016. Cooperation with Morocco and the other relevant countries along this route will be crucial.

Delivering on all these objectives cannot happen without additional funding support. In this light, the replenishment of the North Africa Window of the EU Trust Fund is essential. Whereas some Member States have come forward since the last European Council with additional pledges, it is necessary that all Member States contribute their fair share to close the funding gap of EUR 340 million, of which EUR 110 million is for immediate needs.

Beyond North Africa, the EU Trust Fund supports projects, including for food security, job creation for youth or better migration management, in 21 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and East Africa, through the Sahel and Lake Chad Window and the Horn of Africa Window. EUR 1.2 billion have already been contracted for 178 contracts including cross-window projects. The resources available are reaching their limits. It is necessary to ensure their optimal targeting and efficient use in the remaining years of operation of the Fund while looking into further commitments from Member States in particular in light of the need to implement the results achieved at the African Union-European Union Summit of 29 and 30 November 2017.

The EU and its Member States should maximise the use of leverages, such as visa and other policies, to conclude readmission agreements or practical arrangements with countries of origin and transit.

Looking forward, a strong focus should be maintained on addressing the root causes of migration, through development cooperation, including support for digital components, targeted actions under the EU Trust Fund and multiplying private investment through the External Investment Plan, as well as to develop legal migration packages that can underpin our partnerships.

The African Union-EU Summit has confirmed the potential for a stronger and a broader partnership to emerge among our two continents, centred on youth and development. As migration is a global challenge the EU and Africa will be also actively shaping the future UN Global Compacts on Migration.

**5. FUNDING FOR MIGRATION: ADEQUATE RESOURCES, FLEXIBLE INSTRUMENTS**

Managing migration requires a major investment. At the time when the current generation of EU funding instruments were developed in 2011, migration had a much lower level of priority than it has today. Since the onset of the crisis, the available funding initially programmed for migration was increased by 74.6% (EUR 6 billion) until 2020 to support interventions in all Member States. EU budget support has proved necessary to help Member States under most pressure to address new needs for border control, run hotspots, and to provide the necessary humanitarian support to refugees and migrants, including shelter and health care. Experts and assets made available through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office have reinforced the capacity of action of Member States. EU funding for resettlement by Member States of people in need of protection has opened more legal avenues for migrants to reach Europe safely. These needs will remain in the future.

Well-designed, flexible and streamlined instruments to address migration challenges will be necessary in the coming years. In the past, rigid rules on programming of resources have been an obstacle to respond rapidly to Member States' requests, or led to a systematic recourse to (limited) emergency funding. There are also areas where EU funding instruments could play a stronger role in the future, for example in supporting local communities receiving a large number of migrants or refugees, thus facilitating integration and addressing social and health issues.

Funding is key to underpin the EU's external migration policy. In this area, ad hoc instruments have been required to respond to new priorities, such as the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa or the European Fund for Sustainable Development. While these instruments were created also with the purpose of ensuring blending of resources from both the EU budget and Member States, securing matching national funds has proven difficult. Moving forward, a reflection should be made on how to also guarantee funding for the external dimension of migration, ensuring flexibility, rapid mobilisation and coordinated use of internal and external resources.

The next multiannual financial framework will need to draw the lessons from this experience and also to look ahead at the migratory challenges for the future.

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| *Roadmap to a deal by June 2018 on the comprehensive migration package*  Progress has been achieved by the European Parliament, Council and the Commission on the internal and external dimensions of migration policy. But the migratory challenge and pressure remains very high. In view of our joint commitment to go back to Schengen by summer 2018 and to move to a system ensuring resilience to future crises, the Commission invites the Leaders to agree on the following elements of a roadmap, which would allow Leaders to agree on a comprehensive package by June 2018.   * Intensify work on the reform of the **Common European Asylum System** so that: * the **EU-Asylum Agency** and the **Eurodac proposals** are adopted by March 2018; * political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the **Qualification Regulation** is reached by end of March 2018; * political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the **Reception Conditions Directive** and the **Union Resettlement Framework** is reached by May 2018; * a negotiating mandate on the **Asylum Procedures Regulation** is reached in the European Parliament and the Council by May 2018; * agreement on the right balance between responsibility and solidarity should be achieved in the following steps: * the broad outlines for an agreement are identified by April 2018; * agreement is reached on the right balance between responsibility and solidarity at the meeting of the EU Leaders in Sofia in May 2018 which is swiftly translated into a negotiating mandate for the Council on the **Dublin Regulation;** * political agreement is reached in the June European Council on the overall reform of the Common European Asylum System. * Complete the build-up of an **effective external border management system**, notably by ensuring that Member States contribute all the assets and staff needed for the rapid reaction pools of the European Border and Coast Guard so that they stand fully ready for deployment by March 2018; * Put in place a fully functioning **return capacity in the European Border and Coast Guard Agency** by March 2018 so that the number of returned migrants in operations organised in cooperation with the Agency would increase by at least 20% compared to the same period of 2017 and increase by 50% by June 2018. Building on the positive examples of operational arrangements on readmission recently established with third countries, such as with Bangladesh, such forms of arrangements or readmission agreements with three further partner countries should be established by May 2018; * Ensure that **sufficient legal pathways** into Europe are open. This requires Member States to pledge for the resettlement of at least 50 000 people in need of protection by February 2018, with 50% implemented by October 2018 and the remainder by May 2019 including through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Emergency Transit Mechanism from Libya. Launch the first pilot projects for coordinating legal economic migration offers for key partners countries by May 2018; * Reach a political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the **"Blue Card" Directive** on entry and residence conditions for highly qualified workers coming from third countries by June 2018; * Deliver the different workstreams of the **external migration policy**. Ensure full and sustained implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. Support, in partnership with the Libyan authorities, the African Union and the International Organisation for Migration, a further 15 000 assisted voluntary returns from Libya to countries of origin and, through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Emergency Transit Mechanism, at least 1 000 resettlements from Libya by February 2018. All Member States should contribute to close the funding gap of EUR 340 million for the North Africa Window of the EU Trust Fund by March 2018; * In the light of the conclusions of the EU-African Union Summit, support the work of the EU-African Union-United Nations Task Force and reinforce the **strategic partnership with Africa**, including by rapidly implementing all the components of the **EU External Investment Plan**. The first wave of projects under the European Sustainable Development Fund should be adopted by May 2018.   In order to ensure measurable progress on all different elements of this roadmap, each Member State should appoint a **dedicated migration** **Sherpa**. |

**Appendix 1 - European Agenda on Migration: State of Play of main proposals**

**9**

**14**

**23**

Of these 23 initiatives, **9 have been adopted** by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

**23 main legislative initiatives** have been presented by the European Commission since the Juncker Commission took office.

There are **still 14 Commission legislative initiatives on the table** which the European Parliament and the Council need to adopt.

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| **PROGRESS TO DATE ON THE MAIN LEGISLATIVE FILES, ACCORDING TO THEIR STATUS** | | European Commission | European Parliament | Council of the Eu- ropean Union | Adopted by European Parliament and Council |
| **Proposal** | **Description** | **Status** | | | |
| **International protection: provisional measures for the benefit of Italy and Greece** | This Decision establishes a temporary and exceptional relocation mechanism over two years from Italy and Greece to other Member States. | May 2015 |  |  |  |
| **Uniform format for visas** | This Regulation establishes a new common design for the visa sticker, which modernises the safety features to prevent forgery. | June 2015 |  |  |  |
| **International protection: provisional measures for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary** | This Decision establishes provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, in view of supporting them in better coping with an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries in those Member States. | September 2015 |  |  |  |
| **European travel document**  **for return** | This Regulation establishes a uniform European travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals. | December 2015 |  |  |  |

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| European Commission | European Parliament | Council of the European Union |
| Proposal presented | Negotiating mandate agreed or act adopted | Negotiating mandate agreed or act adopted |
| Proposal to be presented | Negotiating mandate to be agreed | Negotiating mandate to be agreed |

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| **PROGRESS TO DATE ON THE MAIN LEGISLATIVE FILES, ACCORDING TO THEIR STATUS** | | European Commission | European Parliament | Council of the Eu- ropean Union | Adopted by European Parliament and Council |
| **Proposal** | **Description** | **Status** | | | |
| **Reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders** | This Regulation introduces mandatory systematic checks also on EU citizens, against relevant databases when crossing the EU's external borders. | December 2015 |  |  |  |
| **European Border and Coast Guard Agency** | This Regulation establishes a European Border and Coast Guard Agency in order to ensure the effective applica- tion of strong common border management standards and provide operational support and intervention where necessary to promptly respond to emerging crises at the external border. | December 2015 |  |  |  |
| **Entry/exit system (smart borders)** | The Entry/Exit System will register the entry and exit of non-EU nationals and help monitor authorised short stays in the EU. It will modernise external border management by improving the quality and efficiency of controls as well as the detection of document and identity fraud. | April 2016 |  |  |  |
| **Asylum: Dublin System** | This proposal aims to create a fairer, more efficient and more sustainable system for allocating asylum applica- tions among Member States. | May 2016 | November 2017 |  |  |
| **Asylum Agency** | This proposal will establish a fully-fledged European Union Agency for Asylum with an enhanced mandate and considerably expanded tasks, including the ability to deploy asylum support teams and provide operational and technical assistance. | May 2016 | December 2017 | December 2017 |  |
| **Asylum: Eurodac** | This proposal aims at adapting and reinforcing the Euro- dac system to facilitate returns and help tackle irregular migration. | May 2016 | June 2017 | June 2017 |  |
| **Entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skil-**  **led employment ('Blue Card')** | This proposal on legal migration, also known as the ‘Blue  Card’ scheme, was put forward by the Commission in  mid-2016. | June 2016 | July 2017 | July 2017 |  |
| **Uniform format for resi- dence permits** | This Regulation introduces more modern security features to improve the security features of residence permits. | June 2016 |  |  |  |
| **Reception Conditions** | This proposal will harmonise reception conditions throu- ghout the EU. | July 2016 | May 2017 | November 2017 |  |
| **Asylum Qualification** | This proposal will harmonise protection standards in the EU and put an end to secondary movements and asylum shopping | July 2016 | July 2017 | July 2017 |  |
| **Asylum procedure** | This proposal will reduce differences in recognition rates, discourage secondary movements and ensure common effective procedural guarantees for asylum seekers. | July 2016 |  |  |  |
| **Union resettlement fra- mework** | This proposal — about how the EU resettles recognised refugees from outside its territory, such as those in refugee camps — was put forward by the Commission in July last year. | July 2016 | October 2017 | November 2017 |  |

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| European Commission | European Parliament | Council of the European Union |
| Proposal presented | Negotiating mandate agreed or act adopted | Negotiating mandate agreed or act adopted |
| Proposal to be presented | Negotiating mandate to be agreed | Negotiating mandate to be agreed |

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|  | | European Commission | European Parliament | Council of the Eu- ropean Union | | Adopted by European Parliament and Council |
| **Proposal** | **Description** |  | **Status** | | | |
| **External investment plan/ European Fund for Sustai- nable Development** | The co-legislators were able to come to a swift political agreement in June for this proposal, less than a year after the Commission presented it in September 2016.  Its aim is to use EU funds to leverage private investment into the realm of development in Africa and other parts of the EU’s neighbourhood. | September 2016 |  | | |  |
| **European Travel Information**  **and Authorisation System** | This proposal will create an automated system for pre- travel security and irregular migration screening of visa- exempt non-EU nationals. This will ensure that Member States have better information about non-EU travellers coming to Europe. | November 2016 | October 2017 | June 2017 | |  |
| **Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System for:**   * **police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters** | The Commission put forward proposals to revise the Schengen Information System in December 2016, notably with the aim of improving border and migration management. | December 2016 | November 2017 | November 2017 | |  |
| * **border checks** | December 2016 |  |
| * **the return of illegally staying third country nationals** | December 2016 |  |
| **Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and jus- tice (eu-LISA)** | This proposal reviews the Regulation establishing the eu-LISA Agency and strengthens its mandate to make sure it meets current challenges at EU level in the area  of freedom, security and justice. In particular, the Agency will now be responsible for the development and roll-out of the technical solutions to achieve the interoperability of the EU information systems. | June 2017 |  | |  |  |
| **Revision of the rules for temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders** | This proposal - which aims at making the rules on the temporary reintroduction of border controls better suited to current and future challenges - was presented by the Commission in September 2017. | September 2017 |  | |  |  |

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| European Commission | European Parliament | Council of the European Union |
| Proposal presented | Negotiating mandate agreed or act adopted | Negotiating mandate agreed or act adopted |
| Proposal to be presented | Negotiating mandate to be agreed | Negotiating mandate to be agreed |

**Appendix 2 - The EU Trust Fund for Africa**

**Pledges and contributions to the EU Trust Fund for Africa**

Resources currently allocated to the EU Trust Fund for Africa amount to EUR 3.3 billion: over EUR 2.9 billion from the European Development Fund (EDF) and EU financial instruments and EUR 375 million from EU Member States and other donors (Switzerland and Norway), of which EUR 315.1 million have been paid so far. Member States should contribute more to live up to their commitments dating back to November 2015.

**Pledges and Contributions to the EU Trust Fund for Africa**

 (In EUR million, as of 4 December 2017)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Member State/Associated State** |  | |
|  | **Pledged** | **Received** |
| **Austria** | 6 | 6 |
| **Belgium** | 10 | 6 |
| **Bulgaria** | 0.55 | 0.05 |
| **Croatia** | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| **Cyprus** |  |  |
| **Czech Republic** | 1.67 | 1.67 |
| **Denmark** | 10 | 6 |
| **Estonia** | 1.45 | 1.45 |
| **Finland** | 5 | 5 |
| **France** | 9 | 3 |
| **Germany** | 154 | 136 |
| **Greece** |  |  |
| **Hungary** | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| **Ireland** | 6 | 1.2 |
| **Italy** | 102 | 102 |
| **Latvia** | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| **Lithuania** | 0.2 | 0.05 |
| **Luxembourg** | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| **Malta** | 0.25 | 0.1 |
| **Netherlands** | 26.36 | 13.36 |
| **Poland** | 8.13 | 8.13 |
| **Portugal** | 0.45 | 0.45 |
| **Romania** | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| **Slovakia** | 1.6 | 0.6 |
| **Slovenia** | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| **Spain** | 9 | 3 |
| **Sweden** | 3 | 3 |
| **United Kingdom** | 3 | 1.2 |
| *Norway* | 8.78 | 8.78 |
| *Switzerland* | 4.1 | 3.6 |
| **Total contribution** | **375** | **315.1** |
| **Contribution from EU budget[[11]](#footnote-11)[1]** | **2,928.4** | |

As of 4 December 2017, **120 programmes** across the three regions have been approved by the Operational Committee of the EU Trust Fund for Africa for a total amount of around **EUR 1 960.4 million**. A total of **194 contracts** with implementers (86 in the Sahel/Lake Chad, 69 in the Horn of Africa, 16 in the North of Africa region and 23 related to cross-window projects) have been signed so far for a total of amount of **EUR 1 352.2 million**. Total disbursements amount to **EUR 490.6 million**.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Window | Approved Amount | Contracted Amount | Paid Amount |
| Horn of Africa | **665.0** | **430.3** | **146.6** |
| North of Africa | **293.6\*** | **132.3** | **60.4** |
| Sahel & Lake Chad | **988.8\*** | **787.0** | **282.9** |
| Cross-Window Projects | **13\*** | **2.6** | **0.7** |
| Grand Total | **1960.4\*** | **1352.2** | **490.6** |

\*Rounded figures

**The North Africa window of the EU-Africa Trust Fund**

The North Africa window of the EU-Africa Trust Fund is particularly lacking in funds, despite this being one of the most important for reducing flows along the Central Mediterranean Route. The North Africa Window of the Trust Fund has to date approved programmes worth EUR 294 million of which EUR 132 million has been contracted. More funding is needed to close the identified gap of EUR 340 million of which EUR 110 million for immediate needs.

Following the Commission's call in July for more contributions to the North of Africa window, the October European Council called on Member States to ensure sufficient and targeted funding. As of 4 December, more than EUR 140 million of contributions have been pledged to this window:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **COUNTRY** | **DATE OF SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL PLEDGE OR CONTRIBUTION CERTIFICATE** | **AMOUNT** |
| Austria | 13/10/2017 | 3,000,000 |
| Bulgaria | 29/11/2017 | 100,000 |
| Croatia | 27/10/2017 | 100,000 |
| Czech Republic | 05/10/2017 | 989,008 |
| Denmark | 28/11/2017 | 4,031,100 |
| Estonia | 06/07/2017 | 1,000,000 |
| Germany | 10/11/2017 | 3,000,000 |
| 29/11/2017 | 100,000,000 |
| Italy | 20/07/2017 | 10,000,000 |
| Latvia | 26/10/2017 | 250,000 |
| Lithuania | 01/12/2017 | 150,000 |
| Netherlands | 22/11/2017 | 10,000,000 |
| Norway | 16/11/2017 | 2,074,258 |
| Poland | 08/11/2017 | 7,080,746 |
| Slovakia | 24/11/2017 | 1,000,000 |
| TOTAL |  | 142,775,112 |

NB: **France** and **Spain** each pledged an additional contribution of EUR 6 million, and **Ireland** EUR 3 million to the EU Trust Fund for Africa without indicating an allocation by window.

**Appendix 3 - The European Border and Coast Guard**

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, agreed in a record time upon the Commission's proposal, was establishedin October 2016 to ensure that Europe can better protect its common external borders and is equipped to face any new migration and security challenges.

**CURRENT EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD DEPLOYMENTS:**

**742 officers in Greece**


**137 officers in Bulgaria**

**322 officers in Italy**

**91 officers in the Western Balkans**

**79 officers in Spain**

**OVER 1,400 OFFICERS ACROSS THE EU**



**Important gaps hamper the agency’s roll-out**

Over the past year, important steps have been taken to operationalise the new Agency, including the setting up of Rapid Reaction Pools for border guards and equipment. Despite repeated calls for Member States to deliver on their commitments, significant gaps still persist in those pools, especially when it comes to technical equipment. The ongoing joint operations, such as in Greece, Italy and Bulgaria, face similar challenges with a chronic shortage of deployed officers from Member States.

ESTIMATED DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN JANUARY 2018



RAPID REACTION POOL

There is currently a shortfall of almost 206 nominations for border guards for the Rapid Reaction Pool of 1,500 officers


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **MEMBER STATES** | **REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION** | **STILL MISSING** |  | **MEMBER STATES** | **REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION** | **STILL MISSING** |
| **AUSTRIA** | 34 |  |  | **LATVIA** | 30 |  |
| **BELGIUM** | 30 |  |  | **LITHUANIA** | 39 |  |
| **BULGARIA** | 40 |  |  | **LUXEMBOURG** | 8 | 1 |
| **CROATIA** | 65 |  |  | **MALTA** | 6 |  |
| **CYPRUS** | 8 | 8 |  | **NETHERLANDS** | 50 |  |
| **CZECK REPUBLIC** | 20 |  |  | **NORWAY** | 20 | 8 |
| **DENMARK** | 29 |  |  | **POLAND** | 100 |  |
| **ESTONIA** | 18 |  |  | **PORTUGAL** | 47 | 42 |
| **FINLAND** | 30 |  |  | **ROMANIA** | 75 |  |
| **FRANCE** | 170 |  |  | **SLOVAKIA** | 35 | 31 |
| **GERMANY** | 225 |  |  | **SLOVENIA** | 35 | 3 |
| **GREECE** | 50 |  |  | **SPAIN** | 111 | 111 |
| **HUNGARY** | 65 |  |  | **SWEDEN** | 17 |  |
| **ICELAND\*** | 2 | 2 |  | **SWITZERLAND** | 16 |  |
| **ITALY** | 125 |  |  | **TOTAL:** | **1,500** | **206** |

RAPID REACTION EQUIPMENT POOL

Only **14 Member States** are currently contributing technical equipment to the Rapid Reaction Equipment Pool, leaving considerable gaps.

**14 MEMBER STATES CONTRIBUTING:**


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **TYPE OF EQUIPMENT** | **STILL MISSING**  **(ASSETS - MONTH)** |
|  | 53 |
|  | 33 |
|  | 78 |



**Appendix 4 - Relocation and Resettlement**


**Relocation**

Two years on, the EU relocation scheme has proven to be a success, helping refugees start a new life and ensuring that responsibility is being better shared amongst Member States.



**TOTAL:**

**10,842 32,366 21,524**



**RELOCATED FROM GREECE**

**RELOCATED FROM ITALY**

**RELOCATIONS FROM ITALY AND GREECE**

IT

EL

Total

(OCTOBER 2015 - NOVEMBER 2017)

2015 2016

2016 2017

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

August

November

October

September

August

July

June

May

April

March

February

January

December

October

November

September

July

June

April

May

March

February

January

December

November

October

With around 500 people eligible for relocation remaining in Greece and 2 350 in Italy, Member States should transfer the remaining candidates as a matter of urgency. The Commission stands ready to continue providing financial support to those Member States which sustain their relocation efforts.

**Resettlement**

Since 2015, two successful EU resettlement schemes have helped almost 26 000 of the most vulnerable refugees find shelter in an EU Member State, of which 18 563 under the Council Conclusions of 20 July 2015. With these schemes coming to an end, the Commission launched a new resettlement scheme in September for at least 50 000 particularly vulnerable persons in need of international protection to be admitted by EU Member States by October 2019. EUR 500 million has been set aside for Member States’ resettlement efforts in the next two years – EUR 10 000 for each resettled person from the EU budget.

RESETTLEMENT UNDER THE CURRENT EU PROGRAMME

Total of **22,500** pledged

**18,563**persons resettled

The Commission proposed a permanent EU Resettlement Framework in July 2016 to coordinate European efforts in the long term and set up a unified procedure and common criteria. Once adopted, the EU resettlement framework will replace the current ad hoc resettlement and humanitarian admission schemes.

PLEDGES RECEIVED UNDER THE NEW RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME

Total of **50,000** planned

**39,758**

pledges so far

**39,758** pledges so far

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Member State Pledges made so far** | |  | **Member State Pledges made so far** | **Pledges made so far** |
| **Austria** | 0 |  | **Latvia** | 0 |
| **Belgium** | 2,000 |  | **Lithuania** | 50 |
| **Bulgaria** | 110 |  | **Luxembourg** | 200 |
| **Croatia** | 200 |  | **Malta** | 20 |
| **Cyprus** | 69 |  | **Netherlands** | 3000 |
| **Czech Republic** | 0 |  | **Poland** | 0 |
| **Denmark** | 0 |  | **Portugal** | 1010 |
| **Estonia** | 80 |  | **Romania** | 109 |
| **Finland** | 1,670 |  | **Slovakia** | 0 |
| **France** | 10,200 |  | **Slovenia** | 40 |
| **Germany** | 0 |  | **Spain** | 2,250 |
| **Greece** | 0 |  | **Sweden** | 8,750 |
| **Hungary** | 0 |  | **United Kingdom** | 7,800 |
| **Ireland** | 1,200 |  | **TOTAL** | **39,758** |
| **Italy** | 1,000 |  |  |  |

**Appendix 5 – Roadmap to a deal by June 2018 on the comprehensive migration package**

|  |
| --- |
| **ROADMAP TO A DEAL BY JUNE 2018 ON THE COMPREHENSIVE MIGRATION PACKAGE** |
| **In 2018** |
| **BY FEBRUARY** |
| * Member States to pledge at least 50,000 places for the resettlement of people in need of protection, including through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Emergency Transit Mechanism from Libya; * Support at least 15,000 assisted voluntary returns through the International Organisation for Migration and 1,000 resettlements from Libya through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Emergency Transit Mechanism. |
| **BY MARCH** |
| * Adopt the EU-Asylum Agency and the Eurodac proposals; * Reach political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the Qualification Regulation; * Member States to contribute all the assets and staff needed for the rapid reaction pools of the European Border and Coast Guard so that they stand fully ready for deployment; * All Member States to contribute to close the funding gap of €340 million for the North of Africa Window of the EU Trust Fund; * The European Border and Coast Guard Agency puts in place a fully functioning return capacity. |
| **BY APRIL** |
| * Identify the broad outlines for an agreement on the right balance between responsibility and solidarity. |
| **BY MAY** |
| * Reach political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the Reception Conditions Directive and the Union Resettlement Framework; * Obtain a negotiating mandate on the Asylum Procedures Regulation in the European Parliament and the Council; * Reach an agreement on the right balance between responsibility and solidarity at the meeting of the EU Leaders in Sofia and swiftly translate it into a negotiating mandate for the Council on the Dublin Regulation; * Adopt first wave of projects under the European Sustainable Development Fund; * Launch the first pilot projects for coordinating legal economic migration offers for key partners countries; * Increase the number of returned migrants in operations organised in cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency by at least 20% compared to the same period of 2017; * Agree on readmission agreements or operational arrangements with three further partner countries. |
| **BY JUNE** |
| * Reach political agreement in the June European Council on the overall reform of the Common European Asylum System; * Reach political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the "Blue Card" Directive; * Further increase the number of returned migrants in operations organised in cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency by 50% compared to the same period of 2017. |
| **BY OCTOBER** |
| * Implement 50% of the resettlement pledges for at least 50,000 people in need of protection. |
| **In 2019** |
| **BY MAY** |
| * Implement the remaining 50% of the resettlement pledges for at least 50,000 people in need of protection. |

Source: European Commission

1. Data referring to the Italian and Greek rescue operations as well as the European Border and Coast Guard’s Triton and Poseidon operations and Operation Sophia. The International Organisation for Migration's "Missing migrants" project (<http://missingmigrants.iom.int/>) reports 3 020 deaths in the Mediterranean in 2017 (until 27 November), the lowest figures for the last two years (compared to 3 785 in 2015 and 5 143 in 2016) even if every life lost is one too many. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For example, through the Emergency Support Instrument, an average of 32 500 refugees and migrants receive cash support on a monthly basis through the cash programme. In Turkey, the Emergency Social Safety Net – one of the projects of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey - now reaches 1.1 million recipients. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. While Europe's population is projected to be lower in 2050 than it is today, many countries in Africa and Asia continue to experience significant population growth (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. ESA/P/WP/248). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 558 of 27.9.2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Proposed by the European Commission on 15 December 2015, the Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard achieved political agreement by the European Parliament and the Council on 22 June 2016 and formal adoption on 14 September 2016, just nine months after it was proposed. It entered into force on 6 October 2016; the rapid reaction and return pools became operational on 7 December 2016 and 7 January 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Source: EASO Annual Report 2016. The variations in recognition rates may also be influenced by objective factors, but they are nevertheless significant. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2017, 13.12.2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Cf. Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Agreement reached on 3 February 2016 among the 28 Member States and the Commission: EUR 1 billion to be financed from the EU budget, EUR 2 billion by contributions from the Member States according to their share in EU Gross National Income. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. [1] Including other EU financial instruments such as the European Development Fund. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)